This paper reviews the recent development of the welfare state and social policy in the United States and Germany. The empirical study is primarily based on the comparative study of the trends of the "social wage" and the "net social wage" in the two countries over the last two decades. The paper addresses two major questions. The …rst question is whether the expansion of social expenditures has posed any drag on capital accumulation and economic growth in these two countries. The second question is whether the increasing ideological challenges from the right and the competitive pressures of globalization have led to retrenchment of the American and German welfare states in the recent decades.
INTRODUCTION
The welfare state acquired a broad acceptance as a major socioeconomic achievement of the liberal democracy in the Western industrialized countries during the postwar boom period. The modern and modi…ed vision of capitalist democracy o¤ered, on the one hand, the possibility of high growth rate and, on the other hand, the possibility of continued progression of a comprehensive system of social support for a wider population. In the postwar boom decades, the expansion of social and welfare expenditures faced little challenge, since these redistributionary expenditures could be …nanced by a rising economic surplus and the wages of a growing number of employed workers. With the economic crisis the 1970s, the economic growth which made state expenditures relatively cost free and painless was eroded. In fact it was the very legitimacy of the welfare state that came under attack. For over twenty years after the World War II, the Western capitalist nations were successful in generating rapid and sustained growth with high employment through Keynesian economic policies. The "golden age of capitalism" did not endure through the big economic shocks of the 1970s (See Marglin and Schor, 1992) . The subsequent decades brought about a growing perception that the generous western welfare states were unsustainable and perhaps even counterproductive. The welfare state has been subject to rather sharp criticism from its early days and its earlier form when the "Elizabethan Poor law" of 1601 was introduced in England. The critics worried that excessive public spending would erode individual morality and impede economic growth. Thus, the theme is nothing new. But in spite of the continued challenge to the poor relief in the earlier centuries and the Twentieth Century's modern welfare state, social programs rapidly grew in all advanced industrial countries (albeit in various degrees), particularly in the Post-war period. The oil crises of the 1970s changed the prevailing socioeconomic doctrine and the post-war capital-labor accord and more vocal voices were raised against public spending in general, and public social spending in particular acceptances among a larger number of the mainstream economists (Atkinson, 1999 ). An increasing number of economists joined the Right, blaming transfer programs for their contribution to the decline in economic performance. These economists claim that the increasing size of the public expenditures induces economic ine¢ ciency and undermines growth. They also maintain that welfare expenditures often lead to budget de…cits and mounting public debts (Atkinson, 1999:2) . This study will address two major questions (or debates) on the expansion of social programs in the advanced capitalist countries. The …rst question is whether the expansion of social welfare expenditures would have any major adverse e¤ect on capital accumulation and economic growth. This study will examine the net bene…t/ burden position of the working population with respect to state expenditures and taxes in the postwar period. The working population receives bene…ts in cash and in kind from state expenditures and pays taxes. The "net social wage"is the di¤erence between bene…ts received and the taxes paid by the whole population of the working class. The examination of the recent trends of "net social wage" will allow us to determine whether the working population has paid in full or in most part for the bene…ts it has received from social services provided by the state or it has been, indeed, a net recipient of net social wage. The argument that social policy is inherently a drag on capital accumulation and growth may hold if the latter is true and if the net social wage has absorbed a growing portion of stockticker GDP over time. The second question is whether the economic downturn of the 1970s and increasing conservative criticism of the welfare policies has led to a retrenchment of the welfare state in the recent decades in the advanced capitalist countries. Retrenchment of the welfare state pertains to various cost containment e¤orts governments have tried to introduce. Retrenchment may take di¤erent forms in di¤erent countries. It can include cuts in more generous welfare programs and increasing quali…cation conditions to make bene…ts less universal and restrict the number of recipients through mean tested programs. .In general retrenchment may involve rolling-back, restructuring, reforming, and even dismantling the welfare state. The evidence provided in this study on the recent trends of social wage and net social wage will be used to determine whether the conservative attack on social and welfare programs has led to any major welfare state retrenchment in the two countries of our study. We will see that, in spite of the challenge of the new right to the welfare state and the rule of the one of the most (radically) conservative administrations, in the United States (and the United Kingdom), the net social wage ratio (the share of net social wage in stockticker GDP has remained relatively stable in the recent decades.
VARIETIES OF CAPITALISM AND MATCH-ING FORMS THE WELFARE STATE
While the Western advanced industrial countries share a general common background in terms of the development of the welfare state, they have been distinct in the scope and the extent of the social programs that they have o¤ered to the population. Historically, in the United States, the practice of democratic policy has been much less egalitarian than Western Europe, particularly the European "social market economies." Compared to Europe, the United States from her early history has followed a vision of capitalism that has been more (than Europe) based on the principle of free enterprise economy. Nowhere in the world, has what Pontusson (2005) calls market-liberal view been as dominant among main stream economists and in public policy as in America. This view promotes the idea of trade-o¤ between equality and growth. Thus what the welfare state is expected to achieve, a higher level of equality, redistribution, and social protection, goes against the ideals of economic e¢ ciency, growth, and employment. For example, Okun (1975) calls the relationship between equality and e¢ ciency "the big trade-o¤." However, he supports the notion of equal opportunity in a market economy. He argues that inequality of opportunity leads to misallocation of talents, while inequality of rewards brings about more market e¢ ciency by promoting individual incentives to invest, to work hard, and to innovate. In spite of common background, these countries have, however, been distinct in the scope and the extent of the social programs that they have o¤ered to the population. The recent literature o¤ers a typology of welfare states, based on the recognition of the existence of distinctive varieties of capitalism in the contemporary world. We may then classify the advanced capitalist countries into a limited number of groups, each following a particular model of the interaction between the state and the market economy. In Gosta Esping-Andersen's well-known classi…cation of the welfare states, the more market oriented countries such as the United States and the United Kingdom are identi…ed as "liberal" in contrast with more progressive "social democratic"states (Esping-Andersen, 1990) . In David Soskice's more recent classi…-cation the …rst group are considered as "liberal market economies"in distinction with "coordinated market economies"of Europe which o¤er more advanced and generous social programs for the working population (Soskice, 1999) . This classi…cation focuses on the capacity of states, corporations, and labor unions to coordinate their behavior. In a recent study, Pontusson (2005) , the grouping of the OECD countries is based on a general distinction between two major groups of countries, "social market economies" (SMEs) and "liberal market economies" (LMEs). In this typology, the Anglo-Saxon countries of the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Ireland, and New Zeeland are identi…ed as liberal market economies. The LMEs are distinguished by their lower density of the business communities. In these economies, market transactions rather than corporate coordination, largely de…ne relations among …rms as well as relations between the business sector and workers. A second feature of these economies is their weaker unions and less institutionalized collective bargaining system. A third distinction between LMEs and SMEs is their more limited public provision of social welfare and employment protection. In the following section, we will provide an analysis of the empirical evidence for the two countries: Figure 3 ) This net social wage, however, disappeared and tuned into a little negative value, mostly during the second term of the Clinton Administration.
As it appears, the e¤orts of the Clinton Administration to bring down the budget de…cit have in ‡uenced this trend. Figure 2 shows that during this short period, the share of social wage in GDP declined, while the labor tax share in GDP increased to the extent that a slightly positive net social wage turned into a slightly negative net social wage. In fact, Figure 4 shows that a rather signi…cant budget de…cit of the earlier years (6 percent of GDP in 1992) was reversed into a budget surplus in 1998 and reached the 2 percent of GDP in 2000. This was unprecedented in the recent decades. The United States had not seen a budget surplus for years. But it was during the Reagan Administration that the budget de…cit increased to an unprecedented amount and the public debt started to accumulate to a large extent, in most part as a result of the Reagan era supply-side economic policy (or "voodoo economic policy" as President George . One important conclusion that we may derive from the above data analysis is that the net social wage has remained relatively stable in spite of its short-term ‡uctuations. The early 2000s recession happened in spite of a decline in the net social wage. Thus a social wage increase could not be responsible for economic recession. On the contrary, the changes in the net social wage have been in response to changes in the unemployment rate. Figure 5 clearly indicates this point. As Figure 5 shows, there has been a remarkable correlation between the variations in unemployment rate and the ups and downs of the net social wage ratio. Thus from this perspective, the decline of the net social wage as a percentage of GDP during the second term of the Clinton Administration has not been necessarily due to its restrictive …scal policy, but as a result of the lower unemployment rate and less demand on unemployment bene…ts and welfare programs. The Clinton Administration did make the receipt of public assistance more di¢ cult through its "Workfare" form of social welfare program requiring able-bodied adults to work. President Clinton's proposal included a welfare-payment cuto¤ after two years, coupled with a bold program of job training and skill upgrading. The …nal bill, passed in 1996, replaced the existing 60-year-old program. Most recipients were required to work within two years of receiving bene…ts and were, in principle, limited to a lifetime maximum of …ve years on welfare rolls. But, as far as the cost is concerned, it does not seem that this program had a signi…cant impact on the level of social spending. On the other hand, the higher cost of net social wage during the …rst term of the Bush Administration was not due to its "compassionate conservative"programs, but the recession of the early 1990s and associated higher unemployment rate (from 4 percent in 2000 to 6 percent in 2004). Thus on a closer review we …nd out that in reality, the overall e¤ect of social policy has been remarkably stable Page:172 in the entire period.
As we noted earlier and as re ‡ected in Figure 4 , there has also been a close association between the trends of net social wage and budget de…cit. We may, therefore, conclude that higher unemployment rates (in part as a result of recessionary pressures) have led to higher public expenditures in general and social expenditures in particular. Higher level of public expenditures have been required, in part in response to higher level of unemployment requiring the provision of more unemployment bene…ts and higher level of welfare bene…ts (public assistance), and in part in response to the declining economy in the form of discretionary government expenditures or tax cuts. These policy responses would often lead to higher level of budget de…cit as a share of GDP.
In the United States, the variations of budget de…cit as a share of GDP are in most years consistent with the variations of the net social wage ratio. It rises when net social wage ratio rises and declines when net social wage ratio declines. (See Figure 4 ) This does not mean that the increase in net social wage is responsible for a higher budget de…cit. As it appears, the ups and downs of both net social wage and budget de…cit occur in response to the macroeconomic conditions. This becomes evident when we look at Figures 5 demonstrating the variations of net social wage ratios and unemployment rates over this period. Finally, Figure 6 shows that net social wage per worker has remained quite stable over time, while GDP per worker or labor productivity has continuously increased at a stable rate. GDP per worker has increased from about $47000 in 1990 to around $89500 in 2006. In the same period, net social wage per worker has increased from -$100 to $1870. This is an increase of about $2000, while GDP per worker has increased by $42,500. Thus the increase in the cost of net social wage comes to be less than 5 percent of the productivity increase. We can, therefore, conclude that the increase in the net social wage has not been any drag on economic growth. As we indicated, both social wage and net social gage have remained rather stable relative to GDP, changing only in response to changing macroeconomic conditions and unemployment rate. However, the social policy has fallen far short in compensating for the growing inequality and increasing poverty rate in the last three decades. While Public services such as education and health have been distributed more equally than income, their scale has not been su¢ cient to overcome the increasing inequality in income and wealth. As Schiller (2008) states, Americans are becoming more and more convinced that "America is becoming a nation of 'Haves'and 'Have-nots.' Public opinion polls reveal that 60-70 percent of the population perceives that the 'rich are getting richer' while the 'poor are getting poorer.' These perceptions of wide and increasing inequality add intensity to political debates about tax reform ('tax cuts for the rich'), poverty policy, and income support for the middle class (relieving the 'middle class squeeze')." This public sentiment is supported by the data from the annual Census surveys. The data points to rather drastic increasing inequality in the recent decades. In 2006, the lowest quintile got only 3.4 percent of America's total income while the highest quintile got a huge 50.5 percent of the total. This means that the piece of the pie received by the "rich" (the top quintile) is 15 times larger than the slice received by the "poor" (the bottom quintile). Moreover, as the data shows that the split between the "Haves"and the "Have-nots"has been growing over time:
Reza Fazeli, Rafat Fazeli -THE WELFARE STATE AND THE MARKET ECONOMY: THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL POLICY Source: U.S. Annual Census, data drawn from Schiller 2008 This is not to say that the poor has become poorer in absolute numbers. GDP in 1980 was $6.3 trillion in 2006 prices. Thus in 1980, the share of the poor was $265 billion (4.2% of $6.3 trillion) and it increased to $476 billion in 2006 (3.4% of $14 trillion, the 2006 GDP). This is a substantial increase in the standard of living of the poor. Allowing for population growth still the average "poor" household received 40 percent more income in 2006 than in 1980. The point is, however, that the rich has received a much higher proportion of the bene…ts of economic growth than any other income group in the society. In fact, the median household income has declined in dollar term in recent years. The median income has declined from $ 49, 244 in 1999 to $48, 201 in 2006 . The data suggests that the middle-class gained relatively little from the growth of the economy since 1986 and nothing at all since 1999. Thus the data supports the notion of a "struggling middle class." (Schiller, 2008) Not only the rich has become richer, the very rich have gained even more relative to the rest of population. In 2005, Income inequality grew signi…cantly: the top 1 percent of Americans, those whose incomes exceeded $348,000 received their largest share of national income since 1928. The top 10 percent, roughly those earning more than $100,000, also received a level of income share unprecedented Reza Fazeli, Rafat Fazeli -THE WELFARE STATE AND THE MARKET ECONOMY: THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL POLICY since 1928, just before the Depression. In 2005, total income in the United States increased by 9 percent; but the top 10 percent pocketed the entire gain. In fact the gain, in most part, went to the top 1 percent, whose incomes rose to an average of more than $1.1 million each, an increase of more than $139,000, or about 14 percent. The average incomes of the households in bottom 90 percent dropped by 0.6 percent compared to the previous year. (Johnston, 2007) The new data also shows that by 2005, the top 300,000 of the population collectively enjoyed almost as much income as the bottom 150 million. He further argues that race has also been an integral part of this story: ". . . the prospect of poor Southern blacks receiving income from FAP at levels well above their earned wages directly threatened the white economic and political basis of the US South and galvanized opposition from Congressional Southern Democrats. Racial composition of families receiving bene…ts were the most decisive of all explanations: the more blacks on the rolls, the tougher the state policies." In spite of its shortcomings, Brian Steenland's analysis points to a real lost possibility during 1960s and 1970s. The attention to the prospects of the so called "deserving poor" would have de…nitely brought a strong political argument in supporting the guaranteed income policy. Moreover it might address one of the shortcomings of the U.S. welfare policy, promoting the poor not to sick employment in order to remain quali…ed for medicate. It is di¢ cult to know at this time whether this e¤ort would have been su¢ cient for the supporters of this policy to win in the legislative process. The recent struggle for passing the medical insurance bill shows that the dynamics of such legislative processes cannot be entirely predicted in advance.
Reza Fazeli, Rafat Fazeli -THE WELFARE STATE AND THE MARKET ECONOMY: THE AMERICAN AND GERMAN EXPERIENCES OF SOCIAL POLICY

GERMANY
Both state expenditures and social wage have remained quite stable relative to gdp (See Figure 1. ) Figure 2 . shows that social wage and the taxes paid by labor have increased between 1990 and 2006 in a relatively slow rate-somewhat faster between 1990 and 1996 and slower afterwards. The initial faster increase can be attributed mainly to the increasing costs of reuni…cation. The rate of unemployment increased from 7 percent in 1990 to close to 13 percent in 1997. The jump in unemployment rate was more drastic in the East than the West. It almost doubled in the East from about 10 percent in 1990 up to about 20 percent in 1997 (see Ebbinghaus and Eichhorst, 2006) .The gap between social wage and labor taxes has increased in the more recent years ( Figure 2 ). This …gure shows that social wage and labor taxes relative to GDP have both increased with the same rate between 1990 and 1996 (social wage ratio from 28 percent to 33 percent and labor tax ratio 23 percent to 26 percent), implying that the net social wage has remained stable over this period. national_accounts/data/main_tables Thus the gap between social wage ratio and labor tax ratio (or net social wage ratio) has increased from 5 percent in 1990 to 8 percent in 2006 (see also Figure  3 for the trend of the net social wage ratio). /national _accounts/data /main_tables However, the increase in social expenditures ratio from 1990 to 2006 of 4 percent appears to be entirely due to the increase of the social protection from 18 percent to 22 percent over the same period. And the rise of social protection relative to GDP seems to be the result of an increase in the rate of unemployment from 5 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2006. We should add that both social protection ratio and unemployment rate have been relatively stable from 1996 to 2006, the …rst one reaching 22 percent in 1996 and the latter reaching 9 percent in the same year. Figure 4 shows, there is a relative match between the trends of the net social wage and budget de…cit relative to GDP. While net social ratio has been increasing at a slow rate, the budget de…cit relative to GDP has remained almost unchanged, except after 2001 that it has increased modestly up to 4 percent of GDP in 2003 and has gradually declined to its usual trend of around 2 percent. The recent Finance Ministry announcement has forecasted a 2010 budget de…cit of 5.5 percent of GDP. In 2009, the budget de…cit was 105 billion Euros or 4 percent of GDP, which was 2.620 trillion Euros, 5 percent lower than 2008. The 2009 GDP decline was larger than any year since 1945 (Statistisches Bundesmat Deutschland, 2010) What is responsible for this hike in budget de…cit at this time is primarily the stimulus package in response to the current economic crisis. Just recently, Chancellor Angela Merkel announced a 50 billion Euros package, the largest since 1945. In addition, the plan includes a 100-billion-euro loan guarantee to help su¤ering companies hurt by the credit crunch (Ebusiness, 2010). On top of these, the bail-out of the Greek economy, staggered by huge Thus, the moderate rise in the net social wage ratio (net social wage as a percentage of GDP) in the recent years has been, in the most part, in response to the higher unemployment rate rather than a more egalitarian social policy. The association between unemployment rate and net social wage ratio has not been as strong as the United States. In other worlds, the social welfare policy in the German social market economy has been more independent from the economic constraints than in American liberal market economy. However, both German and American welfare states have been resilient (without being overly ambitious in their programs) in spite of the increasing criticism from the right to the Western generous welfare policies. 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our study is concerned with the impact of the state social policy on the working population as a whole. This study provides a basis to evaluate whether the working population has received a net bene…t (bene…t minus taxes) for the overall state expenditures. It does not, however, address the income redistribution among di¤erent income brackets. Pontusson (2005: Table 3 .2) provides a picture of variation in the level of income inequality among OECD countries as well as its change from the early 1980s to the 1990s. The analysis of this evidence leads to two major implications (Luxemburg Income Study, 2004 (CIA Factbook, 2010) . As noted by Gottschalk and Smeeding (1997) and recently by Brandolini and Smeeding (2008) among others, wage and income inequalities have been on the rise across Western nations, particularly in the leading "liberal market economies" of the United States and the United Kingdom.
Pontusson also asserts that "the main tenets of the market-liberal discoursethat the institutional arrangements for more equal distribution of income and consumption lead to slower growth and economic e¢ ciency-are questionable, if not refutable." (Agartan, 2008) . He rejects the myth that the extensive social and welfare programs of the SMEs hinder economic growth, arguing against the supposed trade-o¤ between inequality and economic e¢ ciency, as many American main stream economists have claimed. He disagrees with the conventional outlook that view publicly provided social and welfare services as ine¢ cient, and draws attention to the positive implications of the more egalitarian distributional policies in the SMES. In his view, SMEs have a major advantage to LMEs and that is their high levels of society-led coordination, allowing negotiated policy compromises among the major economic actors. The negotiated solutions between business and labor with the coordination of the government induce growth, while maintaining higher levels of social equality. In support of his arguments, he provides detailed empirical analysis, illustrating that it is not the economic growth but rather job creation that represents a major challenge to the SMES. Je¤rey Sachs, a leading economist himself, disagrees with the economic orthodoxy of the trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency and equity. He maintains that a generous social-welfare state can be compatible with a strong and vibrant economy. It can generate fairness and economic equality, while maintaining global competitiveness. Sachs argues that the Nordic countries present a prime example of why economic prosperity and social protection need not be antagonistic or mutually exclusive ideals. Instead, the Scandinavian model of Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and shows that it is doable to combine a "healthy respect for Page:184 market forces with a strong commitment to antipoverty programs". The high tax Nordic countries have created dynamic and e¢ cient economies through the allocation of resources to research and development, higher education, and infocomm technology. He also maintains that the Nordic nations have been able to produce a desirable balance between social security and internationally competitive market-based economies. "On average, the Nordic countries outperform the Anglo-Saxon ones on most measures of economic performance. Poverty rates are much lower there, and national income per working-age population is on average higher (Sachs, 2006b ). The German "Soziale Marktwirtschaft ," or "social market economy" has not been as egalitarian as the Nordic social market economies in terms of social and welfare programs, but it has o¤ered a much more generous social protection programs than the "liberal market economies." It tries to combine the virtues of a market system with the virtues of a social welfare system. We should add that the high tax Nordic countries and Germany have maintained a relatively low corporate tax rate. Taxes on corporate income have been only 2.4 percent of GDP in Sweden and 2.9 percent of GDP in Denmark in 2002. These numbers are not that much higher than the same ratio for the United States at 2 percent. The corporate tax has constituted a higher percentage of GDP in other liberal market economies: 2.9 percent in the United Kingdom, 3.4 percent in Canada, and 5.3 percent in Australia. The corporate tax ratios have also been relatively low in the Continental SMEs, the most remarkable of which is the German ratio at only 1 percent of GDP in 2002 and 2003 (CBO, 2005 . Thus it is possible to maintain a corporate friendly egalitarian welfare state or as Sachs (2006b) points out a "healthy respect for market forces with a strong commitment to antipoverty programs". Germany enjoyed its strongest growth spurt in 2010 since the country was reuni…ed two decades ago, just a year after su¤ering its worst recession since the Second World War. Powered by buoyant exports to the Far East and an upturn in business investment and household spending, the economy grew by 3.6% last year. "Germany enjoys strongest economic growth since reuni…cation" (Kollewe, 2011 The German growth has not been impressive in the last two decades. The Nordic economies have done substantially better in this regard. German economic policy and industrial strategy worked extremely well for several decades after World War II and those have continued to work well in some regards. One should not lose sight of German miracle of impressive postwar economic recovery and the decades of strong growth, low in ‡ation, and low unemployment. In the mid1970s, German unemployment was less than 2.5 percent, less than half of that of the United States, and its in ‡ation rate was virtually zero. During those years, Germany also experienced a very satisfactory rate of real economic growth that helped her to close the gap between per capita real GDP in Germany and in the United States (Feldstein, 2002) . A possible cause of less satisfactory performance of German economy is the West and East uni…cation of 1990. There is no question that uni…cation shock has been very costly to German economy. Jorg Bibow (2005) has challenged this view, arguing that "Germany's …scal crisis cannot be attributed to uni…cation per se; it arose as a consequence of ill-guided macroeconomic policies pursued in response to that event." He maintains that the structural problems that appeared in the 1990s were, indeed, symptoms of persistent macroeconomic mismanagement and extended domestic demand stagnation. Feldstein (2002) identi…es another problem in the German path to growth. Germany has lost the independent monetary policy as a member of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Thus Germany has no control over the rate of interest and the growth of the money supply, which are now determined by the European Central Bank (ECB) rather than the German Bundesbank. Having been in control, the Bundesbank would have probably pursued an aggressive policy of expansionary policy through interest rate reductions and expanding money supply. This policy would have been consistent with German long history of cautious monetary policy devoted to achieving low in ‡ation. This would be consistent, since an in ‡ation rate of only 2.2 percent would not have Page:186 been alarming. Finally, the trend con…rms that the welfare state and social policy have not retreated and have remained remarkably resilient in the two countries, in spite of the conservative challenges of the 1980s and growing main stream consensus, particularly among economists, that the welfare state has a damning e¤ect on growth and prosperity. In the 1990s the much talked about forces of globalization (accompanied by costly demographic changes and attendant political pressures) seemed to threaten the very existence of the social-market economies of Europe. The results of our study, con…rm that neither the challenges from the right and nor the forces of globalization have succeeded to dismantle the American and German welfare states. We should, however, indicate that social spending as a share of GDP has stagnated or has been growing at a slower rate than the earlier decades. While the working population has not su¤ered big losses in terms of the egalitarian social services, it has experienced a major set-back in the labor market induced income distribution, principally in the United States. It is, then, reasonable to say that while the conservative assault on the welfare state and the merit of a more equitable income distribution has not led to the dismantling of the welfare state, it has contributed to a change of institutions and culture that accommodate the growing inequalities of the recent decades in a number of OECD societies.
